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I. Introduction: The Demise of Property
Rights in Urbania
THE INCREASING INTRUSIVE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT-particularly
federal government-into private affairs has led inescapably to a decline
in the quality and extent of private property rights in the United States.
This is neither novel nor surprising. Land-use controls in the United
States generally had their genesis in the cities, where one person's use of
land could more easily affect that of a neighbor. This generated a ten-
dency, if not a need, to look to government for a remedy. ' Therefore, as
our society has become more urban, the level of government intrusion
into private property rights increased. What follows is a brief overview
of how that intrusion has become manifest in three particular areas in the
past decade:
1. Federal Land Policy,
2. Eminent Domain,
3. Regulation/Taking/Compensation Issue.
The unifying thread in those comparatively disparate land categories is
the central role of the courts-particularly, though not exclusively, the
federal courts. It is in the courts that the nature of the federal govern-
ment intrusion is defined-and at times limited-where the struggle
over freedom from that intrusion is resolved as either a taking requiring
compensation or a regulation requiring nothing.2 Until well into this
century, courts had held that physical takings required both a clearly
*The author acknowledges, with thanks, the comments and suggestions of Professor
Amy Kastely on an early draft of this article, and the research assistance of Lowell Hu,
Cathy Takase, and Nancy Neuffer of the William S. Richardson School of Law.
1. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
1-2 (1972); D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LAND USE ch. 1
(1986).
2. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985), for a view that both regulation and eminent domain are takings, but of
different kinds and leading to different solutions.
defined public purpose and compensation, whereas regulation, if
clearly founded on the exercise of the police power, never required
compensation, no matter how intrusive.' However, the blurring of these
clear distinctions has resulted in greater intrusion of government into
private rights in property, despite decisions which appear on their face
to protect them. Perhaps the most significant blurring has occurred be-
tween the police power and the public use requirement, as one distin-
guished scholar has clearly put it, "the police power is surely not as
expansive as the public use requirement, from which it is almost never
distinguished in modern law."
4
II. Federal Government and the Erosion of
Property Rights
The "federalization" of land-use controls is a well-known phenome-
non,5 an example of federal incursion into areas in which the federal
government was not meant to go. Indeed, so strong has the reaction
against "federalization" generally become that the Section on Urban,
State and Local Government Law of the American Bar Association
(ABA) has proposed a resolution to the ABA's House of Delegates urg-
ing the federal government to curb its abuse of power in all three
branches of government.6 Not so well documented is the incursion of
federal government authority into private land affairs coupled with a de-
crease in private land activities permitted on federal land, thereby in-
creasing federal preemption of state and local land planning and control
regulations, and the militancy of certain agencies in designating activity
zones that have had a blighting effect on private land development.
A. Public Lands/Public Preserve:
Closing to Private Use?
The federal government owns approximately 740 million acres of land
in the United States.7 Nearly 400 million of those acres are administered
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) under the Federal Land
3. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973).
4. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 12 (1986).
5. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
525, 527 (1975).
6. Federalism Resolution and Federalism Report (April 1987) (draft) submitted to
the ABA House of Delegates (June, 1987). See Symposium: Federalism In the Bicenten-
nial Year of Our Constitution, 19 URB. LAW. 443 (1987); Freilich, Montello & Mueth,
The Supreme Court and Federalism, 18 URB. LAW.779 (1986).
7. Comment, The Sale of Fort DeRussy: An Analysis of the Reagan Administra-
tion 's Federal Land Sales Program, 7 U. HAW. L. REV. 105, 106 (1985).
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Management and Policy Act of 1976 (FLMPA).8 Other lands adminis-
tered by the federal government include lands located on the outer conti-
nental shelf (OCS) and lands held for the benefit of Indians, Aleuts, and
Eskimos. 9 Much of the early 1980s literature has focused on the Reagan
Administration's ill-starred plan to dispose of federal lands as a matter
of fiscal policy under the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act (FPASA).'° As recent court cases clearly indicate, it has been
FLMPA with its emphasis upon the planning and retention of federal
lands and away from private use and disposal that represents the real
shift in policy.
1. THE EROSION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
PUBLIC PARKS
In the early 1900s, private holdings-both leasehold and freehold-
were common in our national parks and national forests. Congress au-
thorized the leasing of cabins and other sites by statute in Glacier Na-
tional Park, Lassen Volcanic National Park, Yosemite National Park,
and Indiana Dunes National Park." In Yosemite, private uses included
houses, seasonal residences, mobile homes, rental cabins, a hotel, a
grocery store, and a gas station.' 2 Although leasing in some of the
parks-particularly Glacier-has been prohibited since 1931, it was not
until the 1950s and 1960s that the federal government departed from its
policy of leasing sites on most of its lands, including Forest Service
lands. Now, apparently, it is the Service's goal to eliminate leaseholds
on its lands altogether.' 3 This shift in policy was so obvious that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was led to remark in Idaho v. Hodel'4
that:
The evidence that leasing practices historically were considered to be proper park
uses is sufficient to conclude that Idaho has clearly violated the "public park" re-
striction [in a grant to Idaho) for a state park, made in part from Indian lands held by
the federal government, a tiny portion of which was leased for vacation cabins to
private parties. 5
8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
9. Comment, supra note 7, at 106; 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1982).
10. 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-492 (1982); see Note, Sales of Public Land: A Problem in
Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 96 HARV. L. REV. 927
(1983).
11. Idaho v. Hodel, 814 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lambert, Private
Landholdings in the National Parks: Examples From Yosemite National Park and Indi-
ana Dunes National Lakeshore, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 35 (1982).
12. Hodel, 814 F.2d at 1295.
13. Id.
14. 814 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1987).
15. Id.
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In Hodel, the use of less than 1 percent of Heyburn State Park for private
parties on leaseholds was alleged to be a sufficient violation of the pub-
lic park stipulation in the federal government's grant to Idaho that plain-
tiffs sought a forfeiture of the land under a power of termination. The
court denied relief.
At first blush the idea of private use of public lands, at least in public
parks, seems to offend sensibilities of what is public and what is private.
Bear in mind though, that until recently the federal government permit-
ted all manner of state and local regulation as well as the private use of
public lands. 16 What has occurred also has affected the attempts of local
governments to continue to assert controls over federal lands and activi-
ties on federal lands affecting, for example, private lands in the coastal
zone.
2. THE SUNSET OF STATE AND LOCAL
LAND-USE CONTROLS OVER FEDERAL
LAND
Traditionally, local and state land regulations have applied to federal
lands in a policy which can only be described as schizophrenic in light of
the foregoing discussion. Private parties fortunate enough to obtain or
retain permission to use federal lands for private purposes increasingly
have started to utilize the federal government as a shield against con-
trary state and local land-use controls. The power to legislate to protect
public lands has never seriously been questioned, at least since the Su-
preme Court decided Camfield v. United States in 1897'" and Kleppe v.
New Mexico in 1976.8 Congress, however, as proprietor, always has
had the authority to legislate to protect federal property under the prop-
erty clause of the Constitution.
Based largely on the preceding two cases, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corporation'9 that
county zoning laws could not require a private party to obtain permits to
drill in a National Forest once the BLM granted leases for oil explora-
tion and development. The court held that "the local ordinances imper-
16. See generally BAYNARD, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND PROCEDURE chs. 3, 4 & 8
(1986). See D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, supra note 1, at ch. 10, § F and cases cited
therein; Anderson, Public Land Exchanges, Sales and Purchases Under the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,4 UTAH L. REV. 657(1979); Laitos & West-
fall, Government Interference With Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
17. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
18. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
19. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th. Cir. 1979).
600 SUMMER 1988
PROPERTY RIGHTS 601
missibly conflict with congressional regulation of Gulf's activities on
government land." 20
In an entirely different context, but demonstrating the same general
philosophy, the same court held in Juan Segundo v. City of Rancho Mi-
rage,2' that a local rent control ordinance could not be applied to a mo-
bile home park operated by a private and non-Indian entity on land lo-
cated entirely within an Indian reservation. Such regulations were held
to be preempted by federal law, given the backdrop of tribal sovereignty
coupled with the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the federal gov-
ernment governing the leases of Indian land.22
Perhaps even more indicative of the pervasiveness of the policy of
excluding state land-use controls over federal lands is the recent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in California Coastal Commission v. Granite
Rock Company.23 There, a bare majority of the Court concluded that
certain permit requirements of the California Coastal Commission
(CCC) were enforceable in Los Padres National Forest despite allega-
tions that the state was preempted by BLM regulations and FLMA. The
Court drew a distinction between environmental laws, which could not
be preempted, and land-use planning laws which could be preempted.
However, even a casual reading of the majority and dissenting opinions
indicate the Court was virtually unanimous on one point: if one charac-
terizes the CCC permit requirement as a land-use regulation, it is inap-
plicable to Granite Rock's activities on federal land as a matter of fed-
eral law. The Court appeared to reiterate this view obliquely in its recent
revisiting of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon24 in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,25 analyzed in Part IV of this article.
In discussing the applicability of the statute designed to ameliorate the
effects of potential subsidence, the Court characterized it as reflecting
"the type of environmental concern that has been the focus of so much
federal, state and local regulation in recent decades." 2 6 The Court thus
appeared to be reinforcing its emphasis on environmental, rather than
land-use, laws, which it seemed to have somehow relegated to second-
class status.
In sum, the Supreme Court has drastically reduced the level and inten-
sity of much private land use in public parks, and continues to permit
20. Id. at 1082.
21. 813 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1987).
22. Id. at 1393-94.
23. 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
26. Id. at 1236-37.
considerable overlap of state and local land-use controls on what private
use is still federally permitted on federal lands.
B. Airborne Blight: Air Installation Compatibility
Use Zones
One of the latest wrinkles in the erosion of private property rights by
federal action is the promulgation of Air Installation Compatible Use
Zones (AICUZ) by those units of the Department of Defense (DOD)
with military air bases. Promulgated under the authority of the Noise
Control Act27 or the DOD's general authority to maintain installations
(in litigation the basis of the authority has been in dispute), the avowed
purpose of the AICUZ is to define areas of impact from air facilities
operations and then attempt, through procedural and operational
changes, to lessen those impacts by reducing the area affected. A second
objective is to develop long-range strategies that will prevent or deter
encroachment into impacted areas and thus prevent an increase in nega-
tive impacts. 8
It is this second objective that generally causes problems for private
landowners, when a branch of the armed services with such an installa-
tion promulgates an AICUZ over private land, usually including an Ac-
cident Potential Zone (APZ), based in theory on its flight operations.
The armed services then often lobby the local government with jurisdic-
tion over that private property to restrict land use-by zoning or other
means-in accordance with those low intensity uses which the DOD
deems compatible with its air installation operations. The result is usu-
ally substantial downzoning and/or development plan changes which
restrict use in the AICUZ to low intensity rural or agricultural uses.
So far, those federal courts which have heard AICUZ lawsuits
brought by landowners have tended to side with the DOD, usually on
the now-familiar basis that the federal government does not control the
use of private land around its facilities, and only persuades-in its role
as landowner-local government to change its land-use plans and regu-landwner In ne f the most
lations through lobbying like any other landowner.9 In one o
recent cases, the Air Force objected strenuously to the reclassification
of property for purposes of development, and two pertinent local gov-
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (1982).
28. AICUZ Program Procedures and Guidelines for the Department of the Navy Air
Installations, OPNAVINST 11010.36 (May 25, 1979).
29. De-Tom Enterprises v. United States, 552 F.2d 337, 339 (Ct. C1. 1977).
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ernment bodies denied rezoning from agricultural to commercial use. 30
The court held that:
No improprieties have been shown. The Air Force did strenuously object to the re-
zoning, and the two local bodies denied the applications. Without any
improprieties-secret meetings, untrue representations or the like-high ranking air
force officers repeatedly urged denial of the applications on the grounds of the noise
levels of the overflights and the hazard of crashes from the flights in and out of the
base. . . . In all of this, the Air Force was entirely within its rights as an affected
landowner.'
In a different attack on the AICUZ process, major litigation has
erupted in Hawaii over a recently promulgated AICUZ that covers
much of the city and county of Honolulu's proposed secondary urban
center, west of the present primary urban center-all of which has been
so designated on the city and county's mandatory General Development
Plan. In F. E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins,32 the owners of the designated
secondary urban center sued the Navy alleging not only a taking of
property but also errors amounting to fraud in the collection and use of
data in preparing and promulgating the AICUZ. The owners survived a
motion to dismiss (May 1987) and continue to prepare for trial. It is
worth noting that two of the findings of fact in the Gilliland case de-
scribed how the Air Force found that some of the subject property was
not subject to noise levels as high as those originally found in prepara-
tion of the AICUZ and that when the AICUZ was later amended, the
property was removed." This may be critical given the allegations in the
Trotter case, amounting to a suggestion that without altering any of its
operations, the Navy can and should change the AICUZ to avoid
"blighting" the proposed secondary urban center. The AICUZ is par-
ticularly puzzling, as the installation for which it was promulgated-
Barbers Point Naval Air Station-is a coastal facility and could presum-
ably use the ocean for much of its overflight operations.
III. Physical Takings: Compensation
Preserved, Public Purpose Lost
The Constitution has generally been interpreted to require that private
property may not be physically taken by either the federal government
or the state (or its local government subdivisions) except for a public
purpose, and then, only upon payment of just compensation. This inter-
30. Gilliland v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 709 (1982).
31. Id. at 710.
32. Civ. No. 86-1093.
33. Slip Op. at 26.
pretation has been applied to the states in the same manner by virtue of
the fourteenth amendment despite some ambiguity in the language of
the fifth amendment. However, the Supreme Court has dealt with both
these key aspects of property rights in the 1980s-to compensation and
the public purpose shield against "compulsory purchase" -barely pre-
serving the first and virtually destroying the second.34
Today, despite reservations by a minority of the Court, there is al-
ways a right to compensation for a physical taking, but the public pur-
pose for the taking is whatever the legislative body says it is. Indeed, the
right to compensation now appears to be all that remains of the fifth
amendment as applied to physical takings.35
A. The Preservation of Just Compensation
The centuries-old separation of the common law of regulation and tak-
ing has always carried with it the key guarantee of compensation for the
taking of private property by government, with the rare exception of an
extreme public emergency.16 It therefore came as a considerable sur-
prise to many legal scholars that the blurring of the common law distinc-
tion between regulation and takings by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal in 1922 should culminate in the 1980s in an attempt to infect tradi-
tional standards of compensation for physical takings with the difficult
and, in this instance, insidious practice of "balancing" those character-
istics which represent a "regulatory taking." 37 After all, if the primary
rationale for abandoning the "public purpose" test is, as the Supreme
Court would apparently have it, that it is the only condition which the
fifth amendment places upon the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main," then any attempt to tinker with the principle of compensation for
all physical takings would be chilling indeed.
34. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Ha-
waii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
35. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
36. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES&J. BANTA, supra, note 3; NICHOLS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1917).
37. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
38. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2385-86. See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984); Callies, A Requiem for Public Purpose, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 8 (1985).
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1. PERMANENT PHYSICAL OCCUPATIONS
ARE INVARIABLY TAKINGS
Fortunately, the Supreme Court in 1981 turned back an attempt to tinker
with this principle in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp . 9
The holding of the Court-that "[w]hen faced with a constitutional
challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this
Court has invariably found a 'taking"'-is not nearly so surprising as
the fact that three dissenting justices proposed a contrary "balancing
theory."
At issue in Loretto was the constitutionality of a New York ordinance,
passed pursuant to a state statute, which forbade landlord interference
with installation of CATV equipment upon "his property or prem-
ises.' -40 While the statute originally granted limited rights to compensa-
tion for this invasion of property, a state commission further limited the
amount to one dollar. The equipment amounted to a small box and some
wires to be affixed to the outside of the building.
While agreeing that no formula existed for determining when the ex-
ercise of the police power through a land-use regulation resulted in a
constitutionally protected taking, and that the Court had recently and
frequently so held, the majority pointedly observed that:
Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form
of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case "the char-
acter of the government action" not only is an important factor in resolving whether
the action works a taking, but also is determinative.4
The Court further agreed that its "most recent cases have not addressed
the precise issue before us" but "they have emphasized that physical
invasion cases are special and have not repudiated the rule that any per-
manent physical occupation is a taking." 2 Noting that in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City43 it had clearly stated the need for a
"balancing," the Court concluded nevertheless that "[t]he opinion
does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a
government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without
regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine. "
As to the question of public benefit, the Court held that this was a
proper element to be considered in dealing with the public purpose test
in a regulatory context, discussed below, but not a factor to be consid-
39. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
40. Id. at 423.
41. Id. at 426.
42. Id. at 432.
43. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
44. Id.
ered in deciding whether there had been a physical taking of property:
[w]hen the "character of the governmental action is a permanent physical occupation
of property, our cases uniformly have found taking to the extent of the occupation,
without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
41
minimal economic impact on the owner.
In sum:
We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a
taking. In such a case, the property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation
of compensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive
than perhaps any other category of property regulation. We do not, however, ques-
tion the equally substantial authority upholding a State's broad power to impose ap-
propriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his property.4
In a remarkable disregard of established property rights principles, the
dissent characterized as "curiously anachronistic" the majority's "per
se takings rule" that a permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may
serve.
Emphasizing the relatively harmless nature of the physical invasion,
the dissent would have preferred applying the "multifactor balancing
test" formerly applied only to regulatory takings. 7 It may very well be
that "the Court now reaches back in time for a per se rule that disrupts
legislative determination" and that the decision does indeed represent
an "archaic judicial response to a modern social problem." 4 8 But to turn
the law of real property inside out to accommodate the "new and grow-
ing" CATV industry by infecting it with the balancing test used for reg-
ulatory takings would do grave damage both to the Constitution and to
the rights in private property which the Bill of Rights was designed to
protect. It is just such misguided "legislative determinations" against
which the Bill of Rights was designed to provide a shield.
2. LORETTO'S PROGENY
The dissent in Loretto has not quite given up, however. In FCC v. Flor-
ida Power Corp. ,'49 the Supreme Court held that a federal statute-the
45. 458 U.S. at 434-35. The court noted that:
The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation distinguish it from
temporary limitations on the right to exclude ... temporary limitations are subject to
a more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking. The ra-
tionale is evident: they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his right to use, and
exclude others from, his property.
Id. at 435 n.12.
46. Id. at 441.
47. Id. at451.
48. Id. at 455-56.
49. 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987).
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Pole Attachments Act-regulating rates charged cable television firms
by utility companies for attaching cables to utility poles was not a taking
under the Court's "very narrow" holding in Loretto.5° The Pole Attach-
ments Act was designed to give the FCC authority to set such rents in the
absence of state statutes, to avoid alleged anticompetitive and monopo-
listic charges by utility companies. However, in some instances the
rents were reduced to a fraction of what the utility companies charged,
raising the question of whether the utilities would have granted permis-
sion for such attachments at all at such low rents.5' The plaintiff chal-
lenged the FCC's actions under the Act as a taking of property without
compensation, citing Loretto. Inapplicable, held the Court, since:
[T]he statute we considered in Loretto specifically REQUIRED landlords to permit
permanent occupation of their property by cable companies, nothing in the Pole At-
tachments Act as interpreted by the FCC in these cases gives cable companies any
right to occupy space on utility poles, or prohibits utility companies from refusing to
enter into attachment agreements with cable operators.52
The Court likened the case to a dispute over the economic relations be-
tween landlord and tenant, which it had steadfastly refused to character-
ize as takings, and reiterated that the "element of required acquiescense
is at the heart of the concept of occupation"" which was the basis for the
Court's holding in Loretto.
The Court's disclaimer notwithstanding, this crabbed interpretation
of Loretto would be a considerable narrowing of that holding were it not
for a footnote substantially restricting the applicability of Florida
Power, in which the Court specifically reserved judgment on whether it
would deny the FCC the power to require utilities "to enter into, renew,
or refrain from terminating pole attachment agreements." 54 Presum-
ably it would. Otherwise, permitting the FCC to slash rental rates while
forcing utilities to continue with the rental agreement would amount to
the same confiscation for which compensation was required in Loretto.
On the other hand, both federal and state courts have been quick to
reaffirm traditional standards of taking and compensation for physical
invasions since the Loretto decision. In In Re Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul and Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,55 the court of appeals
rejected the argument that because railroads were heavily regulated,
they must bear an increased burden of diminution in the value of their
50. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1112 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441).
51. Id. at 1110-11.
52. Id. at 1112 (emphasis in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1112 n.6.
55. 799 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1986).
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property without compensation (while broadly finding no compensable
taking for properties sold and transferred pursuant to railroad reorgani-
zation). Citing Loretto, the court observed that:
If Congress condemned a railroad station to serve as a post office, this would be a
taking notwithstanding the web of regulations surrounding the railroad, notwith-
standing that Congress could have diminished the value of the entire railroad in some
other way by an amount equal to the value of the station.56
Having the same effect is Hall v. City of Santa Barbara7 in which the
court of appeals remanded for trial physical takings issues raised by a
city's rent control ordinance. In holding that plaintiffs appeared to raise
substantial physical takings rather than regulatory takings issues, the
court divided recent Supreme Court cases into regulatory takings versus
physical takings categories and observed that "the Court reaches dra-
matically different results depending upon whether it concludes that a
particular governmental action amounts to a physical occupation of
property or merely a regulation." 58 It then observed that the loss of land-
lord's rights under the ordinance and the transferable rights thereby at-
tained by tenants, could well be found to be a physical invasion at a trial
on the merits.
In sum, a physical invasion, unless very temporary, is always a taking
protected by the fifth amendment. This is fortunate because there is pre-
cious little left of the public purpose requirement for the exercise of emi-
nent domain.
B. A Requiem for Public Purpose: Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff59
In 1984, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of
Hawaii's Land Reform Act, emasculating the United States Constitu-
tion's fifth amendment "public purpose" requirement for taking pri-
vate property by eminent domain. It did so by expanding on its pre-
vious language in Berman v. Parker62 and by reinforcing Berman's
equating of eminent domain with government property regulatory activ-
ities under the police power.
56. Id. at 325.
57. 797 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 1498.
59. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
60. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
61. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
62. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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1. HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY V. MIDKIFF
The Supreme Court chose Hawaii's Land Reform Act63 as its vehicle for
abolishing the public purpose requirement, which provides for the con-
demnation of a lessor's fee simple interest in residential housing lots to
sell the same to the residential lessee residing on that lot, all for the leg-
islatively declared purpose of alleviating a litany of social ills related to
land oligopoly. The Supreme Court upheld the Land Reform Act on
broad policy grounds-far beyond those necessary to decide the case.
Commencing with a review of Justice Douglas' opinion in Berman v.
Parker,64 the Court held that: "[W]here the exercise of the eminent do-
main power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the
Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Pub-
lic Use Clause."
65
In Berman, the Court had before it a challenge to the District of Co-
lumbia redevelopment law, the application of which resulted in the tak-
ing of plaintiff's perfectly viable commercial property and its ultimate
conveyance to another private "person," all in furtherance of a rede-
velopment plan to eliminate blight. Although the case is vastly more fa-
mous for Justice Douglas' dictum concerning the use of the police
power to achieve aesthetic goals, it also included his declaration that:
[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress
legislating concerning the District of Columbia ... or the States legislating concern-
ing local affairs.. . . This principle admits of no exception merely because the power
of eminent domain is involved.66
Further, said Justice Douglas:
Once the object is within the authority of Congress the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end. . . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means
by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means
chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants ar-
gue that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of an-
other businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Con-
gress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established.67
Having thus established its point of departure, the Midkiff Court then
reiterated:
63. HAW. REV. STAT. § 516 (1977).
64. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
65. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241.
66. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 33.
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[D]eference to the legislature's "public use" determination is required "until it is
shown to involve an impossibility."..... In short, the Court has made clear that it will
not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public
use "unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.61
It was thereafter a foregone conclusion that "we have no trouble con-
cluding that the Hawaii Act is constitutional.' 69
Indeed, it makes no difference even if the Act never achieves its pur-
pose:
Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its intended
goals. But "whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the
question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if... the . . [state] Legisla-
ture rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective." 7'
How was the Court persuaded to reach this decision on such a broad
basis-unanimously? Much of the credit (or blame) clearly goes to the
appellants who chose to characterize the Hawaii Act as not at all unu-
sual, but simply a part of the normal progression commenced decades
ago. Even if the Court chose to address the policy behind the taking, the
state emphasized that such taking was unquestionably compensated,
and that the adequacy of that compensation was not before the Court.7'
As "even regulations that are held to transfer private property interests
in land so sharply as to be deemed 'takings' trigger at most a require-
ment of just compensation," 7 2 where, the state asked essentially, was
the rub?
That the Supreme Court bought the argument is evident from the most
cursory reading of the transcript of pioceedings before it. 73 Justice after
Justice asked the Bishop Estate what was so unreasonable about the Ha-
waii legislature's public purpose declaration as to warrant judicial scru-
tiny, especially sincejust compensation was provided. Perhaps the most
telling exchange occurred between the state and Justice Rehnquist:
Justice Rehnquist: "I think the guts of the Fifth Amendment condemnation clause is
to guarantee that where there has been a taking the owner will receive fair compensa-
tion, and that isn't even an issue here, that these owners are going to get fair compen-
sation. You want us to go further and say that even where fair compensation is paid,
the state can't condemn unless the courts agree with the legislature's assessment of
public purpose, and I don't think any of our cases support that."
Bishop Estate: "That is precisely our position. ,
74
68. 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at241.
70. Id. at 242 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The aftermath of Midkiff has affected a variety of cases across the
country.
2. MIDKIFF'S PROGENY: IS PUBLIC PURPOSE
DEAD?
As a result of the narrow role Midkiffestablished for the courts in deter-
mining public purpose, a general trend of deference to Congress and
state legislatures has emerged. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company,75
the Supreme Court reiterated its Midkiff decision that "the scope of the
'public use' requirement of the Taking Clause is 'coterminous with the
scope of the sovereign's police powers,' ,76 and that "[tihe role of the
courts in second-guessing the legislature's judgment of what constitutes
a public use is extremely narrow."" The Court followed its limited
function: determining whether a "purpose is legitimate and whether
Congress rationally could have believed that the provisions would pro-
mote that objective." 78 The Court, in Ruckelshaus, found that the provi-
sions enacted by Congress under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act served a procompetitive purpose that was well
within the police power of Congress.79 "So long as the taking has a con-
ceivable public character, 'the means by which it will be attained is...
for Congress to determine." 0
In Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corp. ,"1 the plaintiffs alleged "that the proposed taking of their
building [was] neither for nor rationally related to a public purpose." 82
As the redevelopment project itself had such a purpose, the court found
the plaintiffs' allegations "far too broad to address the limited concern
of the court (and) clearly precluded by the settled law of Berman and
Midkiff that 'absent evidence that a proposed taking treads on a specific
consitutional right, we are concerned only that a taking is rationally re-
lated to some legitimate public purpose.'
83
Even if the "court were to conclude that [the] Project [was] a mam-
moth boondoggle, socially and architecturally ill-advised, it would
still be a question for the political process, not a federal court."
84
Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that no public purpose existed for the
75. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
76. Id. at 1014.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1015 n.18.
79. Id. at 1015.
80. Id. at 1014.
81. 605 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
82. Id. at 614.
83. Id. at 617.
84. Id.
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Project. While the court stated that "federal courts remain available
for challenges to truly private or truly irrational takings," 85 it held
that:
Once a legitimate public purpose for the overall project is conceded .. the court
cannot get involved in parsing the particular degree of public or private motivation
behind the inclusion of a particular site in the Project area, so long as that inclusion
could rationally be related to the public purpose of the plan as a whole.86
For a while, there appeared yet to be some faint ray of hope. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a carefully worded and closely
reasoned opinion, presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
retreat a little from its sweeping Midkiff decision and apply a different
and less deferential standard to legislative determinations of the public
purpose in inverse condemnation proceedings. In Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara,87 the Court discussed the Midkiff decision but noted that "the
Court . . .did not address the somewhat different articulation of the
standard applicable in cases where there was no deliberate exercise of
the eminent domain power." 88 Therefore, "The Midkiff Court left open
the possibility that less deference would be afforded where government
does not intend to effect a taking than where it does." 89
Indeed, the court continued, "[e]ven under the deferential Midkiff
standard, public use is not established as a matter of law whenever the
legislature acts." 90 The court went on to observe that the Midkiff Court
did say that there was a role for courts to play in reviewing a legisla-
ture's judgment of what constituted a public use, and "the test appears
to be whether the legislature chose an objective that is within its author-
ity under the police power, and whether it 'rationally could have be-
lieved that the [Act] would promote its objective.' "9' Speculating once
more that "[t]he test in inverse condemnation cases may well be more
stringent," the court noted that:
Here, the Santa Barbara City Council enacted the ordinance to alleviate what it per-
ceived as a "critical shortage of low and moderate income housing." If appellants'
allegations are substantiated, there would be significant doubt whether these pur-
poses are achieved, or could rationally be thought achievable, by means of the ordi-
92
nance.
85. Id. at 619.
86. Id. at 618.
87. 797 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1986).
88. id. at 1502.
89. Id. at 1503.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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3. YES, PUBLIC PURPOSE IS DEAD AFTER FIRST
ENGLISH
However, even this faint ray may have been eclipsed by dicta in the Su-
preme Court's recent case, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.9 There, Chief Justice Rehnquist
for the majority strongly suggested an interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment which would virtually eliminate consideration of anything but the
issue of just compensation in eminent domain cases of virtually every
stripe:
As its language [the fifth amendment] indicates, and as the Court has frequently
noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property but instead
places a condition on the exercise of that power. This basic understanding of the
Amendment makes clear it is designed not to limit the governmental interference
with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of other-
wise proper interference amounting to a taking. Sic transit public purpose.94
IV. Regulatory Takings Redux and the
Compensation Issue
Commencing with the Supreme Court's famous decision in Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon,95 the federal courts have wrestled with the appli-
cation of the Constitution's fifth (and fourteenth) amendment to regula-
tions that adversely affect the use of land. Although state supreme
courts slowly managed to distinguish away much of the decision's chill-
ing effect upon land-use regulation and continue the regulation of land
use approved by the Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp.9 6
during the fifty years when the Court heard no land-use cases of sub-
stance, the Court reentered the field with a vengeance on April Fool's
Day, 1974, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.97 This case was to raise
the protection of upper- middle-class suburban values to constitution-
ally protected status. In a series of cases98 the Court then attempted to
address and redress the issues and problems raised by Holmes' original
holding that a regulation, if it goes too far, could amount to a constitu-
tionally protected taking. What is "too far" and when is compensation
93. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
94. Id. at 2385-86.
95. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
96. 277 U.S. 365 (1926). For cases so distinguishing, see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAL-
LIES & J. BANTA, supra note 3.
97. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
98. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.
340 (1986).
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an appropriate remedy, once the "too far" has been reached?
Until this year the Court had consistently avoided deciding either is-
sue, erecting a formidable barrier of procedural and "ripeness" barri-
ers to reaching the merits either of the taking issue or the compensation
issue. 99 Early on, the Court decided that there was no "bright line"
pointing the way toward a regulatory taking determination, and the pro-
cess was entirely ad hoc.'0° The test of Pennsylvania Coal"' was de-
clared to be a "balancing test" weighing the public health, safety, and
welfare goals served, on the one hand, against the degree of property
value diminution, on the other. It is perhaps predictable that the Court
would then beg off undertaking the balancing-let alone reach the com-
pensation issue-until it could determine clearly what the degree of
diminution was in each case. This has led the Court to turn back two of
the last four regulation/taking cases on the ground that the landowner
failed adequately either to take advantage of state inverse condemnation
procedures, or to seek and be denied enough local land-use permits and
permissions so as to permit an accurate assessment of how far local
land-use regulations have devalued the subject property.10'
In the 1987 Term there were three cases before the Court dealing with
regulatory takings. The first, largely billed as a replay of Pennsylvania
Coal, was recently decided as a Euclid-like frontal attack on a statute
generally and not as applied. o' The second, decided on exceedingly nar-
row grounds, finds compensation potentially available for temporary
regulatory takings in which governmental regulation prevents all use of
the land.'04The third required an "essential nexus" between a condition
attached to a land-use permit and the land-use need or problem a pro-
posed use of land is expected to generate."'
The sections which follow summarize the current law on regulatory
takings and suggest a consistent theory of regulation/taking. First, it is
exceedingly difficult for a landowner to so much as properly and suc-
cessfully raise the taking issue, let alone reach the compensation issue,
in a case where a land-use regulation is challenged "as applied" be-
99. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
100. Penn Central Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
101. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
102. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
103. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
104. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
105. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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cause of the virtually insurmountable "ripeness" barrier. Second,
based upon the two most recent Court decisions, it is also clear that so
long as a land-use regulation leaves some value or use on the property as
a whole and at the same time addresses proper police power regulatory
objectives, it is going to be virtually impossible for a landowner to suc-
cessfully challenge such a regulation. Third, dedications, exactions,
and impact fees are permissible as exercises of local government police
power, so long as there is a nexus between each of them and the need or
problem they seek to address.
A. Barriers to Suit: Ripeness
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,'° the Supreme Court held that a land developer alleging a regula-
tory taking and seeking compensation for the failure of a local govern-
ment to approve its subdivision was precluded from doing so on ripe-
ness grounds. This was so for two principal reasons. First, the property
owner had failed to avail himself of the state's inverse condemnation
remedy. Second, the property owner had failed to seek other land-use
regulatory relief, partly through seeking use variances which would, if
granted, have met a number of the concerns expressed by county au-
thorities in refusing to grant the needed land development permissions.
This latter requirement, held the Court, was particularly important
since it was impossible to determine whether property values had been
sufficiently reduced by the local regulatory regime so that, when bal-
anced against the exercise of the police power, it could be adjudged to
have gone "too far" until the local government had made a "final" de-
cision.
Coupled with a dissent by Justice Stevens who sympathetically de-
scribed the problems faced by local governments in trying to make deci-
sions in the public interest on land-use matters, the coolness of the
Court's language in the majority opinion-Holmes' famous language in
Pennsylvania Coal referred to as a "notion" and the suggestion that
maybe taking doesn't mean "literally" the fifth amendment-led some
commentators to suggest that the Court might be willing to retreat from
the Brennan dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego,10 7 if not from Pennsylvania Coal altogether." 8 Recall that the
Brennan dissent in San Diego, virtually joined substantively by then-
106. 473 U.S. 172 (1986).
107. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
108. Callies, The Taking Issue Revisited, 37 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIG. No. 7,
July 1985, at 6.
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Associate Justice Rehnquist who sided with the majority on procedural
grounds, reiterated that Holmes-and the Court-meant what was said
about regulatory takings and set out a formula for awarding compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment-to the general discomfiture of state and
local government officials as well as a host of commentators.'°9
What has followed since is a mixed bag. First, the ripeness barrier has
made it increasingly difficult to reach regulatory takings issues in the
lower courts. Although there has been increased litigation after the re-
cently decided cases of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles"° and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission," the litigation has concerned what compensation is pay-
able when and if a regulation is held to be a taking, and whether exac-
tions and impact fees are valid."2 In Golemis v. Kirby,"3 in which the
establishment of a twenty-five foot fire lane was challenged as a taking
without compensation, the district court stated:
There can be no serious question but that the rule of Williamson County applies full
bore to the case at bar. So long as the state offers a suitable prospect for recourse in
respect to the alleged "taking," a landowner must mine that quarry before panning
for gold in the federal hills."'
In Littleton v. Aflton,"' involving a building permit dispute, the court
of appeals held on the basis of Williamson County that "appellants claim
for a taking is premature because the decision of the planning commis-
sion is not final because a variance has not been sought or denied. ,, 6 In
the "quick take" case HMK Corporation v. County of Chesterfield,"7
the district court quoted with approval Williamson County language re-
quiring the seeking of variances before claiming a regulatory taking. In
Schafer v. City of Waupaca, "' plaintiff's fifth amendment claims for de-
nial of a building permit were rejected on Williamson County grounds
"until she has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation
109. For a review of the authorities and strong pleas on all sides, see Williams,
Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L.
REV. 193 (1984); Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A
Reply To the Gang of Five's Views On Just Compensation for the Regulatory Taking of
Property, 19 LOYOLA L.A.L. REV. 685 (1986); Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse
Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983).
110. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
111. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 249-53 for full discussion.
113. 632 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1985).
114. Id. at 163-64.
115. 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 609.
117. 616 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1985).
118. 637 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
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through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining such com-
pensation." "9
In Robinson v. Ariyoshi,2 Hawaii's long-running water rights case
was remanded yet again on Williamson County grounds in a terse, one-
paragraph order.'2 In a building permit rescission case alleging takings
under the fifth amendment, Four Seasons Apartment v. City of Mayfield
Heights,' the court held the plaintiff's claim was not ripe because
plaintiff had not used state inverse condemnation procedures, citing
Williamson County. '23 In Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 24 taking
issues under municipal zoning and noise ordinances were dismissed be-
cause, having failed to file a plan for development, "it is not conclu-
sively apparent whether plaintiffs will be denied all reasonable benefi-
cial use of their properties, so any claim the Ordinance as applied
constitutes a taking is premature.'" 25 More recently, in Lake Naci-
miento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County,2 6 the Ninth Circuit held
that county denial of an "informal development proposal" was not a
"final and authoritative decision exposing the nature and extent of per-
missible development ' 2 7 that is required under Williamson County.
Contrary cases are few and far between. 
28
Second, it is clear from Williamson County and the more recent deci-
sion in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,29 that the Su-
preme Court means what it says about ripeness AND is backpedalling
from both San Diego Gas & Electric (in the dissenting opinion) and
Pennsylvania Coal, as to what constitutes a regulatory taking. Although
the majority (now including Justice Brennan who wrote the San Diego
dissent) duly recites the Holmes doctrine regarding regulatory takings
(a regulation that goes "too far" may be a taking), there is just enough
of the "takings" analysis to permit the Court to reach the conclusion
119. Id. at 177.
120. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), appealed, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985),
modifying, 106 S. Ct. 3269, vacated, 796 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1986).
121. To the apparent discomfiture of Hawaii's senior federal judge who wrote the
original opinion, and who does not think highly of the application of the Williamson
ripeness test to the water rights issues he decided in 1977. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F.
Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. 775 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1985).
123. Id. at 151-52.
124. 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
125. Id. at 104-06 (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamil-
ton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)(emphasis in original)).
126. 830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 980.
128. E.g., Henley v. Herring, 779 F.2d 1553 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Furey v. Sacra-
mento, 780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986).
129. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
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made foregone in Williamson County: since the appellant had not re-
ceived a final local definitive position regarding how the county would
apply its regulations to its property, there was a possibility that some
development would be permitted. Therefore the claim for compensa-
tion was not ripe because the Court could not finally balance the extent
of the "taking" (if any) by regulation.
Lastly, the Court's recent decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal As-
sociation v. DeBenedictis,"3 discussed more fully in Part IV-B below,
makes clear the extent to which the Court is rethinking Pennsylvania
Coal. The majority relegates its precedential value to regulatory taking
situations in which property values have been reduced virtually to noth-
ing or legitimate investment-backed expectations have been wholly
frustrated by exercises of the police powers which are not properly
based upon protecting public health, the environment, or local fiscal
policy.
B. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis: When Does A Regulation Take
Property?
In reiterating the impossibility of setting clear standards for deciding
regulatory taking cases, the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. New York City"' placed considerable emphasis on the legit-
imate investment-backed expectations of the property owner. Half a
century before, the Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 2
had also emphasized the heavy burden upon a property owner when at-
tacking the facial validity of a zoning ordinance, which it said it might
find constitutionally defective in a given instance-and which it did
promptly the following year in Nectow v. City of Cambridge. 3
Whether the Court has simply applied a consistent and clearly sig-
nalled doctrine with respect to land-use cases, or whether it has gone
back to these landmark decisions to bring order to what has recently be-
come an increasingly chaotic area of constitutional law, the Court this
year reexamined Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, '3 and harkened back to
language in both Euclid and Penn Central to fashion-perhaps
reemphasize?-the beginnings of a common law takings doctrine that
appears to be sufficiently different so as to elicit strong objections from
130. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
131. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
132. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
133. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
134. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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four Justices in dissent. In the process, the majority revisited not only
Agins v. City of Tiburon'B5 and Andrus v. Allard,"6 together with the the-
ories which moved lower courts in Deltona Corporation v. United
States,'37 but also Hadacheck v. Sebastian,' and Mugler v. Kansas,3 9
which predated Pennsylvania Coal, and Miller v. Schoene,'" which was
next.
The Court reviewed its decision in Pennsylvania Coal so as to indi-
cate why the balancing test, while appropriate in some instances, was
not appropriate in analyzing a facial challenge. The facts of the case,
especially as compared to those in Pennsylvania Coal, were crucial to
its holding.
Since 1966, Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act 4 ' had prohibited any
mining causing subsidence damage to public buildings, dwellings used
for human habitation, and cemeteries. The state Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources required 50 percent of the coal beneath such pro-
tected structures to be kept in place in order to provide that support.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association alleged that the Act had taken
their (private) property without compensation in violation of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.
The Keystone Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal. In the first
place, Holmes was dealing with a statute-the Kohler Act-designed to
protect private property and "[t]his case is the case of a single private
home."' 2 The damage complained of there was "not common or pub-
lic. ,,143
It was thus not a bona fide exercise of the police power. '" The Court
noted that Holmes had launched "uncharacteristically" into an "advi-
sory opinion" that discussed the general validity of the Act, which had
NOT been before the Court. "4 First, as it served private interests, the
Kohler Act could not be sustained as an exercise of the police power.
Second, the statute made it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal in the areas affected by the Kohler Act. But here, said the Court, the
Subsidence Act was directed at what the state perceived to be a signifi-
135. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
136. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
137. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. C1. 1981).
138. 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
139. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
140. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
142. 260 U.S. at 413.
143. Id. at413-14.
144. Id. at 414.
145. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1241.
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cant threat to common welfare, not the protection of a single private
house. Moreover, there was nothing in the record of the case to indicate
that the Association could not profitably engage in business or that there
would be undue interference with investment-backed expectations.
4 6
1. PUBLIC PURPOSE
The Subsidence Act was not a "private benefit" law like the Kohler
Act, according to the Court. In acting to protect the public interest in
health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area, the state
was exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a nuisance. The
Court then cited Mugler v. Kansas, 141 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylva-
nia, ,48 and Miller v. Schoene, 149 as proof that the Supreme Court had re-
peatedly upheld regulations that destroyed or adversely affected real
property interests, provided that the state's interest in the regulation
was, as here, strong enough. In a footnote, the Court contrasted these
with the physical invasion cases such as United States v. Causby, 50 and
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ,' discussed previ-
ously, in which the Court had almost invariably found a taking to have
occurred.'52 Therefore, held the Court, rather than overruling Mugler,
as plaintiff had suggested, it noted that, if anything Pennsylvania Coal
was consistent with them!
2. DIMINUTION OF VALUE AND
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS
Moreover, and probably more critical, the Court characterized plain-
tiff's showing of deprivation of property rights as not sufficiently signif-
icant to satisfy the "heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory
taking." " The Court's holding here was based on several critical fac-
tors.
a. "Mere Enactment" vs. "Specific Impact'--Facial vs. As Ap-
plied. Noting that it had recently rejected on several occasions takings
claims based upon "mere enactment of a statute," 5 4 the Court quoted
with approval language which stated that, as it had said repeatedly, it
could only decide takings cases based on ad hoc factual inquiries, with
146. Id. at 1242.
147. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
148. 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
149. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
150. 328 U.S. 256 (1960).
151. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
152. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1244 n.18.
153. Id. at 1246.
154. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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reference to particular properties. Shades of Euclid were brought to
mind-zoning is constitutional in principle despite a constitutional
challenge-and Nectow- but it may well be unconstitutional as applied
in a particular instance.
b. Extent of Diminution. Plaintiffs claimed that the Subsidence Act
had forced them to leave 27 million tons of coal in place as support.
Because they owned it but could not mine it, they claimed this resulted
in an unconstitutional taking of private property. The Court rejected the
claim on three grounds. First, the coal in place did not represent a sepa-
rate segment of property for takings law purposes. The Court refused to
concentrate on these separate pillars of coal as distinct property rights,
observing that it had consistently held that when an owner has a full bun-
dle of rights, the destruction of one strand would not be a taking. The
bundle must be viewed in its entirety. 55 To the same effect was Penn
Central, 15 6 where the Court observed that takings jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and does not attempt to de-
termine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abro-
gated.
The Court distinguished Holmes' "certain coal" as being commer-
cially impractical language in Pennsylvania Coal referring to whether
the coal could be extracted profitably, not whether it could be extracted
at all. 157 Moreover, observed the Court, the record indicated that only 75
percent of plaintiffs underground coal could be profitably mined any-
way, and there was no showing that their reasonable investment-backed
expectations had been materially affected by the additional duty to re-
tain the small percentage required to support the structures protected by
the Act.
Second, even though Pennsylvania law apparently regarded the sup-
port estate as a separate interest in land (and if so construed, the effect of
the Pennsylvania regulation on property rights certainly appears to be
greater) the Court was not bound by such construction: "It is clear,
however, that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such le-
galistic distinctions within a bundle of property rights.'" 5 In any event,
the support estate only would have value if viewed in conjunction with
the rest of the estate. There was no indication that plaintiff could not
mine profitably even if they could not destroy or damage surface struc-
tures.
155. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
156. 438 U.S. at 130-31.
157. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
158. Id. at 1250 (citing Allard and Penn Central).
Lastly, even accepting plaintiff s theory that the support estate should
be viewed separately, the Court rejected their taking claim. This was
because plaintiff did not show what percentage of the support estate had
been affected by the Act, and plaintiffs had far more support estate than
they were required to leave in place under the Subsidence Act. 5 9
In a vigorous dissent written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, four of the
nine Justices challenged the majority's recharacterization of Pennsylva-
nia Coal and the economic effect of the Subsidence Act on plaintiff's
business. The Kohler Act indeed was passed to correct "public" evils
and abuses, and therefore it was similar to the Subsidence Act, leaving
Pennsylvania Coal as the guiding precedent for deciding this case. ,60 As
to the question of whether a taking had occurred, the dissent strongly
objected to the heavier burden placed upon plaintiffs challenging a
nuisance-preventing harm to the public, and questioned whether in any
event this case would fit in such a category. Moreover, when dealing
with regulatory takings, contrary to the majority's view, the full bundle
of property rights need not be taken-just a few sticks. In any event, the
Court had in the past dealt with such takings by defining property in
accordance with state law, and given the Pennsylvania definition of a
separate support estate, should do so again here and find that a taking by
regulation had occurred.16' This was odd language from a Justice who
had so carefully observed in Kaiser Aetna v. United States 62 that state
law in the area of real property would have to bend to the Constitution-
and not the other way around. 
63
3. RECENT DECISIONS: THE BARRIER OF ALL
ECONOMIC USE
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the "new" standard appears to be this:
in order to successfully challenge a land-use regulation as a regulatory
taking, a plaintiff must show: (1) it is not merely difficult, but impos-
sible to make a profit on the land as restricted; and (2) the regulation
does not serve a legitimate, general, and substantial public interest in
the health, environment, and fiscal integrity of the area.
Recent cases citing Keystone confirm this analysis. While often cited
merely for what that decision adds to the law of subsidence,'64 a number
159. Id. at 1251.
160. Id. at 1254-55.
161. Id. at 1260-61.
162. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
163. Id.
164. E.g., Citizens Organized Against Longwalling v. Division of Reclamation, No.
380 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 25, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file); Peters Town-
ship School Dist. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1987).
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of other courts are interpreting the takings standard set in Keystone to be
all economic use of the property taken as a whole. Perhaps the most
ringing affirmation of the "new" regulatory taking doctrine comes
from the Third Circuit in Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell,'65 in
which some poultry processors had alleged that a quarantine imposed to
prevent the spread of avian influenza amounted to a taking of property
without just compensation. In rejecting the allegation and affirming the
validity of the regulation, the court held that "Keystone Bituminous
makes clear that to prevail on a regulatory taking claim, a claimant must
establish both that the governmental action falls outside the traditional
police power, and that the governmental action sufficiently interferes
with investment-backed expectations."'66
A more thorough and detailed analysis of "takings" law, particularly
the threshold issues which need first to be addressed, comes from the
Washington Supreme Court in Orion Corp. v. Washington. 16 7 There, a
development corporation alleged a taking of its substantial coastal land-
holdings by the state through the application of a state coastal zone plan
and the establishment of a nature reserve. After recounting at length
Washington's extensive takings jurisprudence and noting its alliance
with those jurisdictions making a clear distinction between fifth amend-
ment takings and fourteenth amendment due process claims, the court
interpreted Keystone and First English, discussed in Part C below, to
"insulate" the state from any and all takings claims under certain cir-
cumstances:
As we read the Keystone CoalAss 'n opinion, exercises of the police power cannot be
characterized as a compensable taking whenever the state imposes land-use restric-
tions in order to safeguard the "public interest in health, the environment, and the
fiscal integrity of the area." . . . This insulation from the takings analysis continues
even if the regulation denies a landowner all economically viable use of the property.
.. . We assume, however, that because the police power has its limits, even insu-
lated regulations must withstand the due process test of reasonableness.
68
At several points in its lengthy opinion the court expressed some frustra-
165. 816 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1987).
166. Id. at 915.
167. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987). See infra notes 216,232, and accom-
panying text.
168. Id. at 621, 747 P.2d at 1080. The rest of the opinion, though extremely long,
bears reading thoroughly as an indication of how courts might usefully deal with the
assessment of damages in complex "takings" structures. Useful as it is, the dissent is
probably accurate in observing the case was not "ripe" for review under any reasonable
application of Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985). The developer had apparently never sought a "substantial" develop-
ment permit or variance, so that the government agencies involved had no real opportu-
nity to grant or deny development permits.
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tions with the Supreme Court's failure to substantively cite Keystone in
its later Nollan and First English opinions, despite some dicta on takings
in both cases; thereby, in the court's view, continuing to muddy the wa-
ters concerning the taking issue threshold. 
16 9
The Supreme Court of North Dakota emphasized the Keystone re-
quirement that all of a landowner's property interests must be examined
in deciding whether a regulatory taking has occurred. In Grand Forks-
Trail Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle,'70 the court held that land-use restric-
tion statutes bearing upon underground water lines were not a taking by
regulation because under Keystone, "[i]n determining whether a re-
striction constitutes a taking, courts look to the effect of the restriction
on the parcel as a whole, rather than to the effect on individual interests
in the land.' "7' Here, "the statutes do not prohibit all or substantially all
reasonable uses of the regulated property as a whole.'- 72 To the same
effect, concluding that a regulatory taking of mineral rights had oc-
curred, is Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co. ,71 where the court
noted the issue was the "destruction of Western's entire bundle of
rights....
The extent of the use of land which a regulation must "take" before a
court will characterize it as a "regulatory taking" is addressed in the
First Circuit decision in United States v. Rivera Torres.'75 There, a land-
owner in Puerto Rico alleged such a regulatory taking when prohibited
from developing wetlands under the Clean Water Act. Citing Keystone,
the court quoted an earlier Supreme Court decision 76 with approval:
Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to
the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent
"economically viable" use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has
occurred. 17
A diametrically different interpretation is suggested in the Ninth Circuit, however, in
Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987). Dealing with consti-
tutional claims arising out of the denial of property owners' subdivision application, the
court of appeals cites Nollan for the proposition that "even if the government's action is
a legitimate exercise of the police power, it is not insulated from a taking challenge,"
834 F.2d at 1496. Once again, coherent analysis among decisions following the Su-
preme Court's recent opinions in Keystone, First English, and Nollan is challenging
since the latter two barely cite the former, while containing dicta on the same taking
issues.
169. Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1499.
170. 413 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987).
171. Id. at 346.
172. Id. at 347.
173. 737 P.2d 478 (Mont. 1987).
174. Id. at 483.
175. 826 F.2d 151 (lst Cir. 1987).
176. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
177. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 121.
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To the same effect is the Ninth Circuit decision in Lake Nacimiento
Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo,178 where the court reiterated
the test to successfully challenge a county zoning restriction as a taking
of property: whether "it denies an owner economically viable use of his
land." '79
C. First English: Compensation For Taking of
All-or All Economic- Use
Once over the "ripeness" and "taking" hurdles, what about the "com-
pensation" issue? After exhausting all avenues for land use permitting
and demonstrating that the property has no economic use, can a land-
owner claim compensation for a "regulatory taking"?
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los An-
geles," an again divided Court decided yes, in certain circumstances.
The church sued the county for passing an interim ordinance prohibiting
most development on its property. Rains had caused flooding which de-
stroyed the church's summer camp, following which the county had
temporarily designated the property, located along a creek, as a flood
protection area. The California courts held that the remedies available
to a plaintiff alleging deprivation of use of land by ordinance were de-
claratory relief or mandamus. The church sought only damages.
In reversing, the Supreme Court for the first time held that compensa-
tion may be an appropriate remedy for the regulatory taking of all of a
landowner's property, "We merely hold that where the government's
activities have already worked a taking of all property, no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensa-
tion for the period during which the taking was effective.
' '
1
8
1
1. A CRITICAL ASSUMPTION: ALL USE
"TAKEN"
But that is all the Court held. The Court did not grant compensation to
the church. The Court sent the case back to California simply because it
interpreted the California courts to have forbidden money damages for
government regulations that denied an owner all use of its property. The
Court did not say that floodplain controls-or any other land-use
controls-take property. It specifically refused to so hold: "We [ac-
cordingly] have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue
178. 830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1987).
179. Id. at 981.
180. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
181. 107 S. Ct. at 2389 (emphasis added).
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actually denied appellant all use of its property. . . . ", 82Therefore, this
decision is no precedent for deciding what is, or is not, a regulatory tak-
ing of property; that was decided in the Keystone case, discussed ear-
lier. In First English, the Court said only if an ordinance temporarily
denies all use to a landowner-that is, assuming the difficult ripeness
and balancing barriers to proving a regulatory taking have been
surmounted-a state court may not forbid compensation as a remedy.
2. A CRITICAL ASSUMPTION: BEYOND
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO ENACT
SAFETY REGULATIONS
The Court did not say that, if floodplain controls do take property, the
owner is entitled to money damages, apparently even if that prevents all
private use of land: "We have no occasion to decide . . . whether the
county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had oc-
curred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as part of
the state's authority to enact safety regulations."' 83 Therefore, even the
most grievous effects on private property values may be justifiable if the
public need for the regulation is sufficiently dire. "4The First English
decision is therefore limited to the very narrow situation where govern-
ment has lost a "regulatory taking" case.
The dissent (three Justices) points out that the Court probably should
never have reached the compensation issue at all, having possibly mis-
read the California rule on compensation for regulatory takings. Never-
theless, the Court held that "[t]hese questions, of course, remain open
for decision on the remand [which] we direct today."'"5 If this means
that Los Angeles County can avoid paying money altogether by show-
ing either that the church retains some use of its property, or that the
regulation is necessary as a safety regulation, then it is not at all clear
why the Court could not wait to have these questions determined before
deciding the "compensation" question. The Court has four times previ-
ously refused to reach the "compensation" question, and on more facts
and fewer assumptions than it was willing to make here. 
86
Now that state courts may not absolutely forbid compensation as a
182. 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
183. Id. at 2384-85.
184. Indeed, the Court so held in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.
Id.
185. Id. at 2385 (emphasis added).
186. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
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remedy for temporary regulatory deprivation of all private land use, it
would appear that:
1. If, for example, a state or a county should zone land "park" and
forbid all (not substantially all, nor all economic, but ALL) land
use, then IF (as is likely) a court should find that the state or county
regulation results in a constitutionally protected taking, money
damages are available for the period from the application of the
regulation to the property to the date of the court decision. The
finding of a regulatory taking is likely because, under the Key-
stone case discussed previously, the Court sets great store by the
health, environmental, and safety need for the regulation and the
extent of the economic use left, which, presumably, would be
none in the case of a park.
2. Virtually all other land-use ordinances, plans, and permit deci-
sions are left intact by the First English decision, as the Court
makes clear, "We limit our holding to the facts presented and of
course do not deal with the quite different'questions that would
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
change in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not
before us." 87
3. RECENT DECISIONS: NO EFFECT ON
"TAKING" ISSUE AND NOT MUCH
COMPENSATION
Is the decision an aberration, or a harbinger of things to come? The few
cases decided since First English give no clear picture, but on balance,
the trend appears to be a restrictive interpretation, harkening back to
Keystone, and a strict standard for first finding a regulatory taking. In
Grand Forks-Trail Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle,'88 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota reversed an award of compensation to plaintiffs for the
relocation of a water line. Noting that the premises as a whole retained
substantial value, the Court first reiterated the Keystone standard con-
cerning divisible property rights:
In determining whether a restriction constitutes a taking, courts look to the effect of
the restriction on the parcel of land as a whole, rather than to the effect on individual
interests in the land. 89 ... In our view, prohibiting a landowner, and thus his lessee
187. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 ("Here we must assume that the Los Angeles
County ordinances have denied appellant all use of its property for a considerable period
of years, and we hold that invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair value for
the use of the property during this period of time would be a constitutionally insufficient
remedy.").
188. 413 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987).
189. Id. at 346 (citing Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248).
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or grantee, from constructing "any electrical supply or communication line, gas, oil
or water or other pipeline" within 100 feet of the center line of a state highway with-
out the Commissioner's consent . . . do[es] not prohibit all or substantially all rea-
sonable use of the regulated property as a whole.,9o
Continuing, the Court expressly distinguished First English: "In First
English, the complaint alleged 'that the ordinance in question denied
appellant all use of its property." 9' The statutes involved in this case do
not deny all use or substantially all use of the property as a whole."' 92
The extent to which courts will react to egregious instances of takings
by regulation, even if temporary in nature, is clearly illustrated by
Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove.' 93 There, the local government "out-
lawed" construction of apartment complexes after a referendum oppos-
ing them, and after granting landowners a building permit (upon which
they relied to their detriment) for their fully-complying proposed com-
plex. Citing First English, the court found the landowner's compensa-
ble interest as follows, even though the property was worth more after
the lifting of the restriction than before:
In the case of a temporary regulatory taking, the landowner's loss takes the form of
an injury to the property's potential for producing income or an expected profit ...
The landowner's compensable interest, therefore, is the return on the portion of the
fair market value that is lost as a result of the regulatory restriction. Accordingly, the
landowner should be awarded the market rate return computed over the period of the
temporary taking on the difference between the property's fair market value with the
restriction.. . . Under this approach, the landowner recovers what he lost. To award
any affected party additional compensation for lost profits or increased costs of de-
velopment would be to award double recovery; the relevant fair market values by
definition reflect a market estimation of future profits and development cost with
respect to the particular property at issue.94
Indeed, one circuit court of appeals, citing First English, has sug-
gested that if it so happens that temporary damages exceed permanent
damages, the higher award may be justified. In Yuba Natural Re-
sources, Inc. v. United States,'9' the federal government erroneously
claimed certain mineral rights during the period when gold was valued
far higher than either before or after the period of claim. The court held
that the temporary period was the one for measuring damages, even
though the award would be far less if permanent damages were
awarded.
190. Id. at 346-47 (citing Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248).
191. Id. at 348 (quoting First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389).
192. Id. For a similar view in a condominium conversion ordinance dispute (held
unconstitutional); see Seawall Ass'n v. City of New York, 523 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1987).
193. 833 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987).
194. Id. at 271.
195. 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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However, it is also true that even after First English, courts are mak-
ing it clear of the need to show first no alternative economic use remains
of the property despite the offending regulation. Thus, in the condomin-
ium conversion case of Hornstein v. Barry, 96 the court observed, citing
First English, that:
[A] showing that a legislative restriction on land use (e.g., rent control, preservation
of historic landmarks, etc.) will diminish the market value of a given piece of real
estate is not sufficient to establish an illegal taking, if alternate uses survive which
provide an aggrieved owner a reasonable financial return.197
Moving to the issue of whether all economic use or "all use" is the
proper standard for deciding whether a regulation works a constitution-
ally protected taking, the Ninth Circuit has held that the standard is all
economic use after First English. In Citizen's Association of Portland v.
International Raceways,,98 the court emphasized that:
Whether an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation has occurred
depends upon whether the owner has been deprived of economically viable use of the
property .... Mere reduction of property value is insufficient to establish a taking.
...The recent Supreme Court decisions in [First English and Nollan] are not to the
contrary. Both of those cases involved land use regulations so extensive they consti-
tuted a taking.9
Further, in Herrington v. County of Sonoma,2° the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the trial court that landowners had suffered a regulatory taking
when the county denied their subdivision application in order to pre-
serve the land for agricultural use in accordance with a county plan. The
court interpreted First English as requiring that, "In order to succeed
with a regulatory taking claim, a property owner must demonstrate that
all or substantially all economically viable use of the property has been
denied." 
20
As in the Orion case (discussed earlier, Part B, and below) the court
also distinguished between due process and "without compensation"
takings, suggesting that while the latter requires proof of virtually all
value taken, the former "does not require proof that all use of their
property has been denied," but that the burden to show that the land-use
restriction is arbitrary or irrational is correspondingly extraordinarily
heavy and, as a result, the damage award may be lower.2 2 Finding that
196. 530 A.2d 1177 (D.C. 1987).
197. Id. at 1185.
198. 833 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1987).
199. Id. at 762.
200. 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
201. Id. at 1497.
202. Id. at 1498.
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the landowners' due process claims were thus ripe, the court neverthe-
less found that, because they were left with their property, there had
been no permanent taking and that the damage award-based on such a
permanent and total taking-was "grossly excessive."'2 03
At least one federal district court has cited with approval that part of
First English which supported the idea that the ordinance in question
denied plaintiff all use of its property. In Campbell v. Sales Tax District
#3 of St. Tammany Parish,2 ° the court then pointedly observed that
there was "no similar allegation in [this] case. ,205
However, the better view is probably that suggested by the Oregon
Court of Appeals in Dunn v. City of Redmond 2° Citing First English,
the court noted that "First English Evangelical states no new standards
about when governmental regulations give rise to takings subject to fed-
eral constitutional redress.207
In Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown North, Ltd. ,20 the
Supreme Court of Georgia denied compensation for loss of access rights
for a commercial parking lot. In response to takings claims based on the
First English decision, as well as Nollan, discussed in the section below,
the court first set out the rule in Georgia, "A limitation on a land-
owner's use of his property [through zoning] does not rise to the level of
a constitutional deprivation when that limitation is the result of the
proper exercise of the police power. If the ordinance is valid, then its
enforcement could not constitute a taking.2°9
In a footnote to that portion of the opinion, the court made it crystal
clear it did not see how either the First English or the Nollan decisions
would change that rule:
Midtown cites two recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning land
use regulations. First English ... provides for an immediate remedy for a total taking
of property. Nollan ... holds that conditional zoning will not be upheld unless there
is a sufficient connection between the conditional zoning and a valid land use regula-
tion. . . . Neither case addresses controlling issues of this case."O
On the other hand, the Washington Court of Appeals chose to read First
English and Keystone very broadly-indeed erroneously-in reversing
the denial of a plat approval for failure to provide sufficient access, and
203. Id. at 1563.
204. 673 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. La. 1987).
205. Id. at 794.
206. 86 Or. App. at 267 n. 1, 739 P.2d 55 n. 1.
207. Id.
208. 257 Ga. 496, 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987).
209. Id. at 497, 360 S.E.2d at 570-71.
210. Id. at 497 n.2, 360 S.E.2d at 570 n.2.
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for violating a minimum five-acre density requirement."' In Augustson
v. King County,22 the court ordered the county to approve a "short
plat" without the above conditions and remanded for additional pro-
ceedings on the issue of damages. In noting that Keystone and First En-
glish "would appear to lend credence to respondent's position," 2 3 the
court misstated the Keystone test and left out the critical "all" in front of
value in stating the First English test.1
This opinion is difficult to square with the Washington Supreme
Court's opinion in Orion Corp. v. Washington,25 discussed earlier in
Part B. There, the court noted that a police power regulation would,
under First English, be insulated from a taking/compensation claim al-
together if it were passed pursuant to a state's authority to enact health
and safety regulations. The court then cited a number of instances in
which the Supreme Court arguably had demonstrated what it meant by
such insulated safety regulations. 26
Finding that the creation of the marine sanctuary on plaintiff's land by
the State of Washington was not so insulated, the court remanded for
evidence on whether aquaculture was a viable use of plaintiffs' prop-
erty. If so, then the creation of the marine reserve would proximately
cause the denial of all reasonable use and plaintiff had a good compensa-
tion claim. Otherwise, the other "profitable" uses were denied by en-
forcement of the state's coastal zone management plans which were ar-
guably so insulated, and regardless of the extent of taking, plaintiff
would have no cause of action.2 7
Finally, a California appellate court addressed the inapplicability of a
compensation remedy for normal delays in the zoning process. In Guin-
nane v. City and County of San Francisco,28 the court of appeal held that
delaying the granting of a building permit pending environmental re-
view did not constitute unreasonable delay, given plaintiff's delay in
submitting documents deemed necessary for the review, "[T]here is
nothing in First English which alters the established principle that the
211. Augustson v. King County, 49 Wash. App. 409, 743 P.2d 282 (1987).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 412 n.2, 743 P.2d at 285 n.2 (holding that an action for an unconditional
taking may lie where there is a showing that land-use regulations result in diminution of
value and loss of investment-backed expections or both).
214. Id. (holding that even a temporary denial of a landowner's use of his land may
be compensable).
215. 109 Wash. 2d 621,747 P.2d 1062 (1987). See supra note 183 and infra note 216
and accompanying text.
216. 109 Wash. 2d 621 n.23, 747 P.2d 1062 n.23.
217. Id. at 643, 747 P.2d at 1084.
218. 197 Cal. App. 3d 862, 241 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1987).
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interim burden imposed on a landowner during the government's
decision-making process, absent unreasonable delay, does not consti-
tute a taking.2 9
One thing is more certain: the "decision today will generate a great
deal of litigation. 220 Courts still uphold the proper exercise of the po-
lice power (local land-use controls never were a "no-lose" proposition
for government) and are not prepared to open the public treasury for
every-or even most-land-use regulation that reduces the value of pri-
vate property.
D. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: Fees,
Exactions, the Rise of "Nexus," and the Demise
of "Reasonable Relationship"
The Supreme Court appears to have given its collective blessing to im-
pact fees, dedications, exactions, and other conditions on land develop-
ment in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission .22 The decision goes
a long way towards settling a growing national debate over the proper
standards for such conditions .222 It does not affect at all the Court's clear
rejection of compensation for well-founded land-use regulations in Key-
stone Bituminous Coal. It has nothing whatsoever to do with First En-
glish.
1. THE IMPACT FEE
One of the most innovative and potentially burdensome (for land-
owners) mechanisms for the funding of public facilities made necessary
by growth is the impact fee. Typically, an impact fee is levied upon a
development to pay for public facilities the need for which is generated,
221
at least in part, by that development. Impact fees are superior to in-
lieu fees, dedications, and assessments for the following reasons:
1. Impact fees can be used to fund types of capital facilities not usually subject to
dedication requirements and fees in lieu thereof;
2. Since they are not tied to dedication requirements, impact fees can more easily be
219. Id. at 865, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
220. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389-90 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
222. See BOSSELMAN & STROUD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT EXACTION ch. 4
(1988); Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 B.Y.U. J. OF PUB. LAW 261, 315330
(1987). See generally Exactions: A Controversial New Source for Municipal Funds, 50
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1987); DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS (Frank & Rhodes
eds. 1987).
223. Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure Paying the Costs of Growth Through
Impact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges, (Lincoln Institute/Land Policy Mon-
ograph No. 855 1985).
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applied to public facilities, the need for which is generated by, but located outside
of, the development;
3. Impact fees can be applied to condominiums, apartments, and commercial devel-
opments which create the need for extradevelopment capital expenditures, but
which often escape dedication or in-lieu fee requirements found in subdivision
ordinances which typically apply only to single family detached residential devel-
opment;
4. Impact fees can be collected at various stages, such as when building permits are
issued, or at other times when growth creating a need for new services occurs,
rather than at the time of platting.
In assessing the validity of impact fees, state courts first inquire into
whether enabling legislation authorizes the municipality to impose the
fee. If there is sufficient authority to impose a fee, courts then address
the relationship between the development upon which the fee was levied
and the amount and use planned for the fee. Generally, state courts have
used three approaches in determining the reasonableness of this rela-
tionship: (1) the "rational nexus" test, as applied by the Florida courts
and a growing majority of other jurisdictions; (2) the more restrictive
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test, as formerly applied in Illi-
nois and Rhode Island; and (3) the less restrictive-indeed generous-
"reasonable relationship" test, applied by the California courts.2 24 Nol-
lan appears to reject the last and embrace the first. That is probably a
good thing.
a. The Rational Nexus Test. The rational nexus test is the most
widely used standard for examining development exactions, especially
the impact fee. First proposed by Heyman and Gilhool in 1964, 221 the
test was quickly picked up by courts in both New York and Wisconsin in
226landmark dedication and exaction cases. Some commentators claim it
became the "national standard" by the end of the 1970s.227 The test has
two-parts. First, the particular development must create a "need," to
which the amount of the exaction bears some roughly proportional rela-
tionship. Second, the local government must demonstrate that the fees
levied will actually be used for the purpose collected, by proper "ear-
marking" and timely expenditure of the funds .228
224. Smith, A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 5 (1987).
225. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119
(1964); see BOSSELMAN & STROUD, supra note 222.
226. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137
N.W.2d 608 (1965).
227. See BOSSELMAN & STROUD, supra note 222, at 74.
228. Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development
Linkage, 9 NOVA L.J.381, 397-99 (1985).
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The Florida courts adopted the rational nexus test for impact fees in a
series of recent decisions, beginning with Contractor & Builders Asso-
ciation v. City ofDunedin 229 There, the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the concept of impact fees, even though it struck down the particular
ordinance requiring an impact fee for sewer and water connection, for
failing to sufficiently restrict the use of fees collected: "In principle,
however, we see nothing wrong with transferring to the new user of a
municipally owned water or sewer system a fair share of the costs new
use of the system involves. , 230 For an impact fee ordinance to be valid,
the court held that: (1) new development must generate a need for ex-
pansion of public facilities; (2) the fees imposed must be no more than
what the muncipality would incur in accommodating the new users of
the system; and (3) the fees must be expressly earmarked for the pur-
poses for which they were charged .2
These requirements were further refined in Hollywood, Inc. v. Bro-
232
ward County, which upheld an ordinance requiring dedication, an in-
lieu fee, or an impact fee as a condition of plat approval, to be used for
the capital costs of expanding the county park system. The court held
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power:131
[W]e discern the general legal principle that reasonable dedication or impact fee re-
quirements are permissible so long as they offset needs sufficiently attributable to the
subdivision and so long as the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the sub-
stantial benefit of the subdivision residents. In order to satisfy these requirements,
the local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus,
between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population gener-
ated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show a reasonable connec-
tion, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds collected and the bene-
fits accruing to the subdivision.'-
Seven months later, another Florida court upheld an impact fee for
road improvements in Home Builders & Contractors Association v.
Board of Palm Beach County Commissioners.2" The county ordinance
required new land development activity generating road traffic (includ-
ing residential, commercial, and industrial uses) to pay a fair share of
the cost of expanding new roads attributable to the new development.
The court found that the ordinance met the Dunedin tests for a valid im-
229. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
230. Id. at 317-18.
231. Id.
232. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983).
233. 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
234. 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
235. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
1984).
SUMMER 1988VOL. 20, No. 3
PROPERTY RIGHTS
pact fee because it recognized that the rapid rate of new development
would require a substantial increase in the capacity of the county road
system, and tied this need to the new development by a formula based on
the costs of road construction and number of motor vehicle trips gener-
ated by different types of land use.236
b. The "Reasonable Relationship" Test. As a general rule, Califor-
nia courts uniformly had upheld (until Nollan) the constitutionality of
required dedication or payment of a fee as a condition of land-use ap-
proval when the following conditions were met: (1) the municipality is
acting within its police power; (2) the conditions have a reasonable rela-
tion to the public welfare; and (3) the municipality does not act in an
arbitrary manner.
As to the first requirement, the California courts give a broad inter-
pretation to the police power. Rigorous land-use regulations, and devel-
opment exactions in particular, constitute a proper exercise of the police
power. The leading California case is Associated Home Builders v. City
of Walnut Creek237 in which the court stated:
The rationale of the cases affirming constitutionality indicate the dedication statutes
are valid under the state's police power. They reason that the subdivider realizes a
profit from governmental approval of a subdivision since his land is rendered more
valuable by the fact of subdivision, and in return for this benefit the city may require
him to dedicate a portion of his land for park purposes whenever the influx of new
residents will increase the need for park and recreational facilities. . . . Such exac-
tions have been compared to admittedly valid zoning regulations such as minimum
lot size and setback requirements."'
As to the second requirement, California only requires that exactions
bear some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the develop-
ment. In Walnut Creek, the court rejected any direct nexus theory, stat-
ing that an ordinance requiring dedication or in-lieu fees "can be justi-
fied on the basis of a general public need for recreational facilities
caused by present and future subdivisions."
239
California courts have also upheld the use of impact fees as a proper
exercise of a municipality's police power. In J. W. Jones Co. v. City of
San Diego ,2" the court of appeal held that San Diego could use its police
power to impose "facilities benefit assessments" (FBAs) on developers
in order to fund a broad spectrum of public improvements including wa-
ter, sewer, roads, parks, transit and transportation, libraries, fire sta-
236. Id. at 144.
237. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
238. Id. at 645, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
239. Id. at 637, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
240. 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1984).
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tions, school buildings, and police stations. FBA payments were ear-
marked for the area of benefit and solely for the purpose for which the
fee was levied. The court rejected a challenge that the FBAs were an
invalid tax, finding that a new development paying the fees had ade-
quately benefited from the improvements since the FBAs were tied
closely to the planning process. The court also examined the underlying
policy of what the city was trying to do in controlling explosive growth:
"The vision of San Diego's future as sketched in the general plan is at-
tainable only through the comprehensive financing scheme contem-
plated by the FBA.'
241
As these decisions demonstrate, the California test grants broad dis-
cretion to municipalities in the area of development exactions. Because
of the underlying rationale of development as a "privilege," developers
rarely succeed in challenging fees imposed as a condition of develop-
ment. The standard employed by the California courts in reviewing
such fees is far less stringent than the rational nexus test applied by themajoity f oter . .. 142
majority of other jurisdictions. Indeed, as one commentator aptly
stated, the major legal issue involving development exactions in Cali-
fornia "is not whether dedication or the payment of fees as a condition
precedent to development can be required, but to what extent and in
what amount they can be required." 243 This is what troubled the Su-
preme Court in Nollan.
c. The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Test. A minority ofju-
risdictions apply the specifically and uniquely attributable test, primar-
ily in cases involving dedication and/or in-lieu fees. Illinois originally
made the most prolific use of this test, as set out in Pioneer Trust and
Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect.2 There, a developer chal-
lenged the validity of an ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate one
acre per sixty residential lots for schools, parks, and other public pur-
poses. The Illinois Supreme Court held:
But because the requirement that a plat of subdivision be approved affords an appro-
priate point of control with respect to costs made necessary by the subdivision, it
does not follow that communities may use this point of control to solve all of the
problems which they can foresee.4 5
To be considered a reasonable regulation under the police power, re-
241. Id. at 758, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
242. Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1983).
243. Curtin, Dedications, Exactions and In Lieu Fees: The Inverse Condemnation-
Taking Issue 8-9 (County Counsel Ass'n Spring Conference, Santa Cruz, Cal., May
1986).
244. 22 111. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
245. Id. at 377, 176 N.E.2d at 801.
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quirements imposed upon the subdivider must be within the statutory
grant of power to the municipality, and must be "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to his development. The need for additional
school and recreational facilities, although admittedly aggravated by
the 250-unit subdivision, was not specifically and uniquely attributable
to the new development and thus, should not be cast upon the subdivider
as his sole financial burden. The fact that the present school facilities of
Mount Prospect were near capacity was the result of the total develop-
ment of the community. Therefore, the dedication requirement was
held to be an invalid taking without just compensation.
Rhode Island adopted the Pioneer Trust test in Frank Ansuini, Inc. v.
City of Cranston. The court struck down a city regulation requiring
subdividers to dedicate at least 7 percent of the land area of the proposed
plat to the city to be used for recreation purposes. It held that the invol-
untary dedication of land was a valid exercise of the police power only
to the extent that the need for the land required to be donated resulted
from the "specific and unique activity attributable to the developer. ,
247
By applying the restrictive Pioneer Trust test to developer exactions,
courts impose substantially the same requirement as a special assess-
ment, thus effectively precluding their use for most extradevelopment
capital funding purposes. The Pioneer Trust test quickly becomes diffi-
cult to reconcile with local governments' planning and funding prob-
lems caused by rapidly accelerating development. Consequently, state
courts-including those in Illinois248-have begun turning away from
this restrictive standard as outlined above. 49
2. "LINKAGE" PROGRAMS
Impact fees should be distinguished from linkage programs, so called
because they "link" development approvals to the provisions of some
perceived public need-most often, affordable housing-without at-
tempting to draw a "rational nexus" between the development pro-
posed and the public improvement to which it is linked.2 ° While such
programs have clearly been successful in providing large amounts of
246. 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970).
247. Id. at 914.
248. Illinois has since moved closer to a rational nexus test. See Krughoff v. City of
Naperville, 68 I11. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
249. Juergensmeyer, supra note 223.
250. See Kayden & Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analy-
sis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987).
housing in places like San Francisco,25' there is considerable debate
about their legality, 252 and courts in Massachusetts have expressed
strong reservations about the constitutionality of such programs.2 3 Af-
ter Nollan, the bare "linkage" program is in all likelihood, not only
indefensible, but unconstitutional as well.
3. THE NOLLAN CASE
Decided on the last day of the Court's 1987 Term, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission21 deals ostensibly with beach access. Plaintiffs
sought a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Com-
mission in order to tear down a beach house and build a bigger one. The
Commission conditioned the permit on the granting of an easement to
permit the public to use one-third of the property on the beach side. For
the privilege of substantially upgrading a beach house, the owner was
forced to dedicate to the public lateral access over much of his backyard
for more beach for the public to walk upon. A California court of appeal
had held this was a valid exercise of the Commission's police power
under its statutory duty to protect the California coast.
The Supreme Court reversed .255 Noting that the taking of such an ac-
cess over private property by itself would require compensation, the
Court then examined whether the same requirement, imposed under the
police or regulatory power of the Commission rather than under its
powers of eminent domain, would modify the "just compensation" re-
quirement.
The direct holding of the Court was that in this case it did not and that
compensation was required. The rationale of the Court was critical.
The Court observed that land-use regulations do not effect takings if
they substantially advance legitimate state interests and do not deny an
owner the economically viable use of his land. But even assuming
(without deciding) that legitimate state interests include, in the Com-
mission's words, protecting public views of the beach and assisting the
public in overcoming the psychological barrier to the beach created by
overdevelopment, the Court could not accept the Commission's posi-
251. Thirty million dollars in contributions, 53,000 housing units either rehabili-
tated, rebuilt, built, or under construction, $40 million collected in Boston, according to
representatives of the San Francisco mayor's office and Boston's Redevelopment Au-
thority in a recent presentation at the semiannual meeting of the Urban Land Institute in
Honolulu on May 23.
252. Kayden & Pollard, supra note 250, at 127.
253. Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass. 315,496 N.E.2d 640 (1986), reports deci-
sion on other grounds. The trial court expressed doubt about the exaction for housing
linked to hospital construction.
254. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
255. Id.
638 THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 20, No. 3 SUMMER 1988
PROPERTY RIGHTS
tion that there was any nexus between these interests and the condition
attached to Nollan's beach house redevelopment. The Court observed:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how
it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to
remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans'
new house. We therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the permit condi-
tion cannot be treated as an exercise of its land use power for any of these purposes.
Sic transit "linkage. 
256
However, said the Court, it is an altogether different matter if there is an
"essential nexus" between the condition (read impact fee or exaction)
and what the landowner proposes to do with the property:
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have pro-
tected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding the construction of the
new house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on
fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we as-
sumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the con-
dition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to the facts
of the present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby
with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.
...The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition sub-
stituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification
for the prohibition. . . . [T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose the building restriction converts that purpose into something other than what
it was. The purpose becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve
some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever
may be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests" in the takings and land use
context, this is not one of them.257
In short, the Supreme Court appears to have adopted the "rational
nexus" test concerning exactions, in-lieu fees, and impact fees over the
broader California rule which apparently affected the imposition of the
condition on the Nollan property. The case also means that naked link-
age programs 5 8 which seek to impose fees, dedications, and conditions
on the development process, merely because the developer needs a per-
mit and the public sector needs an unrelated public project, are in all
probability also illegal. As one well-known commentator suggested
with regard to a proposed Chicago linkage program:
256. Id. at 3149.
257. Id. at 3147-48.
258. See, e.g., BOSSELMAN & STROUD, supra note 222, at 381; Valla, Linkage: The
Next Stop In Developing Exactions, 2 Growth Management Studies Newsletter No.4,
June 1987; Kayden & Pollard, supra note 250.
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It will be difficult enough to sustain a housing linkage program on the ground that
there is a reasonable relationship between the construction of commercial office
space and the need for additional housing. It will be even more difficult to demon-
strate that connection when the exacted payments are used for a variety of unknown
neighborhood development projects.29
A more troublesome aspect of the Nollan case is its meaning in the
regulatory taking context generally. Reconciling the decision with the
Keystone case can be particularly troubling. After all, if the Court was
serious when it said that the indivisible nature of property rights
should be considered in assessing the extent of economic loss, then
how is it that Nollan surmounts the barrier? At most, what has been
"taken" is an easement for access certainly less valuable than the min-
eral rights in Keystone, which, in the hierarchy of property rights, is at
least a profit a prendre.26° Moreover, as the dissent in Nollan points
OUt, 26 1 the Nollan property is clearly worth more as redeveloped than
before, and, even with the contested easement, the economic effect is
minimal.
The Nollan majority is precious little help in resolving these issues, as
several state and federal courts have pointedly observed in the course of
their opinions. 262 This is not entirely surprising given that the Nolan ma-
jority consists of the Keystone dissent together with Justice White.263
It has been suggested that the Nollan case will force local govern-
ments to reexamine their "traditional" subdivision exactions, such as
for public street dedications, in light of the "essential nexus" test to see
if they will withstand a takings challenge.' 6' Something of what Justice
Scalia meant- and around which he forged his majority in Nollan-can
be gleaned from his dissent in the recently decided rent control case of
Pennell v. City of San Jose.265 In departing from Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion upholding San Jose's rent control law-particularly that
part which appears to uphold the most controversial provision permit-
ting the denial of rent increases on the basis of a tenant's ability to pay-
Justice Scalia distinguishes "traditional" land-use regulations which
don't "totally destroy the economic value of property," which he is ap-
parently quite willing to accept. He writes:
259. Smith, supra note 224, at 28.
260. II A.L.P. Part. 8, ch. 1.
261. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. E.g., Orion Corp. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
263. For further commentary on this and the Nollan dissent, see Peterson, Land Use
Regulatory "Takings " Revisited: The Three Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 335 (1988).
264. BOSSELMAN & STROUD, supra note 222.
265. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
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Traditional land-use regulation (short of that which totally destroys the economic
value of property) does not violate this principle because there is a cause-and-effect
relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil
that the regulation seeks to remedy. Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but
for the regulation, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that
he has been singled out unfairly. Thus, the common zoning regulations requiring
subdividers to observe lot-size and set-back restrictions, and to dedicate certain areas
to public streets, are in accord with our constitutional traditions because the proposed
property use would otherwise be the cause of excessive congestion. 66
This language is significant for several reasons. First, Scalia appears to
accept the "destruction of all economic use" test set forth in Keystone,
lacking which a regulation of land is not a taking of property for consti-
tutional purposes. Second, Justice Scalia appears ready to accept a po-
lice power basis for a traditional land-use regulation well beyond health
and safety, and certinly beyond nuisance. Correcting a social evil is suf-
ficient basis which smacks of general welfare. Third, traditional exac-
tions such as road dedications and setbacks are legal provided there is
always some sort of connection-like the need to avoid traffic conges-
tion. This is all a far cry from the more extreme potential interpretations
of Nollan, and far closer to the views expressed by a majority in Key-
stone, from which Justice Scalia joined in vigorous dissent.
4. RECENT CASES: FEW, NARROW, AND
INCONCLUSIVE
After Nollan, it may be well-nigh impossible to demonstrate the connec-
tion between exacted payments and development projects. While there
has been little time for a substantial body of common law to develop
around Nollan, so far the few cases do not reflect much change in judi-
cial attitude toward regulatory takings. Indeed, some courts appear bent
on restricting its application to physical invasion cases, the way the Su-
preme Court first discussed the issues. In Grand Forks- Trail Water Us-
. 26 1
ers, Inc., v. Helle, the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the
applicability of Nollan to a water line relocation case on the ground that
Nollan involved a permanent physical occupation, while "the instant
case does not involve a permanent physical occupation." 2 68 An Arizona
court of appeals has taken an even broader view in Westwood Home-
owners Association v. Tenhoff.269 In an action to close a home for the
developmentally disabled on the ground that it violated a restrictive cov-
enant, the court held that state statutes declaring rights of the develop-
266. Pennell, 108 S.Ct. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring).
267. 413 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1987).
268. Id. at 348.
269. 155 Ariz. 229, 745 P.2d 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
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mentally disabled to be state policy prevented the enforcement of such
covenants. To the claim that this amounted to a taking of property
(rights enforceable through covenants) without compensation, the court
noted that "a legislative refusal to enforce restrictive covenants against
otherwise unobtrusive group homes would substantially advance that
interest by promoting the integration of the developmentally disabled
into all segments of the community. As the Supreme Court recently
stated, "We have long recognized that land use regulation does not ef-
fect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and
does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land. . ,270
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court held the Nollan case inapplica-
ble to a loss of a right of access through the destruction of a nonconform-
ing building, 271 and the Mississippi Supreme Court found nothing in
Nollan "which requires a different result" in denying that a requested
zoning reclassification from residential to commercial did not amount to
272
a confiscatory taking of property without compensation.
Finally, the California courts are testing the extent of the Nollan
"nexus" language by upholding a California Coastal Commission per-
mit requirement that clubs impose membership conditions precluding
discrimination in order to obtain a Commission development permit .273
One court reasoned that:
Here, in contrast [to Nollan] there is a direct connection between the governmental
purpose of maximizing public access to state beach land, and the condition which
was imposed. Again, by precluding discrimination against minorities in the club's
membership policies, the Commission maximized the possibility that all segments of
the public will have access to the legal land.274
An appellate case interpreting Nolan more narrowly is easily distin-
270. Id. at 236, 745 P.2d at 983 (quoting Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146).
271. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown North, Ltd., 257 Ga. 496 n.2,
360 S.E.2d 569, 570 n.2 (1987). However, at least one justice of the Atlanta Supreme
Court would interpret Nollan more restrictively, though he has erroneously read the
case. In Turner v. City of Atlanta, 257 Ga. 306, 357 S.E.2d 802 (1987), Justice Smith
based a dissent in part on his reading Nollan to "imply that if the government takes
property, whether in the form of a physical taking or a regulatory taking, by zoning or
otherwise, be it temporary, or permanent, partial or whole, the government must com-
pensate the citizen for the taking." 357 S.E.2d at 803 (emphasis added). This, of
course, flies in the face of the Court's unambiguous "regulatory taking" standard in
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246-50 (1987), discussed in Part B of this article.
272. Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2d 902 n.3 (Miss. 1987).
273. Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 197 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal
Rptr. 168 (1988).
274. Id. at 178, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
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guishable because it deals solely with the question of who should pay for
public access."'
The question remains, can governments condition building subdivi-
sions upon dedicating public parks? Of course they can, if the subdivi-
sion generates a need for a park and its residents will derive some bene-
fit from it. Can governments condition building a new high-rise upon
the setting-aside of 20 percent of the units for low-income families?
Probably not. There is a "nexus" between condition, problem, or need,
and development in the former that is lacking in the latter. Is it wise for
governments to do either the former or the latter? That is a matter of
land policy-upon which the Constitution is, thankfully, so far silent,
and upon which the Supreme Court has said, thankfully, very little.
In sum, the law of takings is increasingly consistent in its return to the
law as it was before Pennsylvania Coal. Until that case, the Supreme
Court never had thought to characterize a regulation as a potential fifth
amendment taking, and to circumscribe that jurisprudential aberration,
represents a needful correction to that judicial avulsion from which
states had been shifting away by accretion for half a century. The Nollan
and First English cases coupled with the Brennan dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric constitute a warning to those state and local government
agencies that are tempted to misuse the police power in land-use regula-
tions. But it is the Keystone case that sets out stringent limits to the appli-
cation of the takings clause at all, and there is nothing in either First
English or Nollan to gainsay those limits. The question never was, what
has the owner lost. Nor has it been, until recently, has the government
left any use of the property. Rather, the first and preeminent question is
and always was: does the regulation represent a proper exercise of the
police power?
V. Conclusion
The decline of private property rights in an urbanizing America may be
inevitable. The proximity of uses in an urban area makes land-use con-
trols under the police power a public necessity, whether by means of
zoning, subdivision controls, building codes, or housing codes. This
does not mean that all such police power regulation on the use of land is
well-founded and legally defensible. However, it most certainly does
275. Augustson v. King County, 49 Wash. App. 409, 743 P.2d 282 (1987). The
Maryland Court of Appeals also cited Nollan in Maryland Port Admin. v. Q.C. Corp.,
310 Md. 379,529 A.2d 829 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), but only for the obvious propo-
sition (after Keystone and First English) that a taking can occur without a physical inva-
sion.
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not mean that declaratory relief for the landowner, and the occasional
injunction or writ of mandamus, will almost always suffice. When gov-
ernments act maliciously, other remedies may be necessary.276 This is,
however, no reason to take an "implacable stand against zoning"; it is
the reason why such regulation should indeed remain, for the most part,
"outside the eminent domain clause" of the Constitution. 277 Perhaps
Professor Grey is right-though the word "taking" should not be used
in quite so cavalier a fashion-in framing the issue as'follows:
1. Is there a prima facie governmental taking of private property?
2. If so, is it justified by the police power?
3. If not, is it a taking for a legitimate public purpose?
4. If so, has there been just compensation?...
The Keystone case at least suggests that the Supreme Court is close to
adopting the first two steps of Grey's analytical framework when it is
alleged that a regulation takes property rights. Even the First English
decision concedes that the state's regulatory authority may "insulate" it
from having to pay compensation for the rare regulatory taking. Unfor-
tunately, the same decision reflects the views in Berman and Midkiffthat
for eminent domain purposes, the third inquiry-into public purpose-
is judicial history, leaving only the fourth: has there been just compen-
sation. At least, the Teleprompter decision leaves property owners with
compensation, no matter how slight the physical invasion.
In sum, that the Supreme Court has affected private property rights
fundamentally is undeniable. The fundamental shift appears to be away
from the takings notions of Pennsylvania Coal via Keystone, rather than
towards them, via Nollan and First English. In this shift, the Court's
major physical takings cases, from Loretto to Midkiff (with the possible
exception of Granite Rock), are remarkably consistent: a (proper) land-
use regulation is valid and noncompensable so long as there remains
some private use in the land. That was the law before Pennsylvania
Coal, and that is the law today. There is precious little indication in re-
cent Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate that the law will be much
different tomorrow.
More troublesome is the erosion of private property rights by agen-
cies of the federal government-and more difficult to defend. Here, the
276. See Justice Stevens' dissent in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). For a general defense of such land-use regula-
tions and why it is that compensation is not required, see Williams, Smith, Siemon,
Mandelker & Babcock, supra note 109.
277. Epstein, supra note 4, at 17.
278. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.21, 29 (1986).
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intrusion comes not so much in urban, but in rural areas where private
land uses are under broad attack on much of the nation's federal public
lands, particularly in national parks. While it is possible to trace such
intrusions to concerns for protecting "what's left" spawned by the de-
velopment, if not urbanization, of other parts of the country, this is
probably too tenuous if not downright simplistic. The British have a far
more urban population and on far less land, yet most of its parks are on
private land with a variety of private land uses permitted thereon, from
219farming to mining.
That the federal government needs to be curbed generally, its modern
tendency to intrude into not only private but state and local government
spheres as well, is increasingly evident. It should start by reexamining
some of its land-use policies in light of their often needlessly adverse
effects on private property rights. Although we probably must regulate,
it is worth taking care that in this period of critical examination of our
constitutional values and protections, we do not lose by degrees what
our founding fathers sought to protect in a more simple time and more
rural place. There are many values and rights enshrined in that Constitu-
tion. Lest we forget, private property is one of them.
279. For descriptions of such parks and the planning control framework in which
they fit, see CULLINGWORTH, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN BRITAIN ch. 10
(1979); THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 133-35
(Reilly ed. 1973); F. BOSSELMAN, IN THE WAKE OF THE TOURIST: MANAGING SPECIAL
PLACES IN EIGHT COUNTRIES, ch. 9 (1978); HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW
(1985); GRANT, URBAN PLANNING LAW 304 (1982).

